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Abstract
Whether ﬁxed factors such as land constrain per-capita income growth
depends crucially on two variables: the substitutability of ﬁxed factors
in production, and the extent to which innovation is biased towards
land-saving technologies. This paper attempts to quantify both. Using
the timing of plague epidemics as an instrument for labor supply, I es-
timate the elasticity of substitution between ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors
in pre-industrial England to be signiﬁcantly less than one. In addition,
I ﬁnd evidence that denser populations  and hence higher land scarcity
 induced innovation towards land-saving technologies.
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1 Introduction
One of the least understood aspects of economic development is the extent to
which ﬁxed factors constrain economic growth.1 The debate has a long history.
Malthus (1798) predicted that humanity, if left unchecked, would breed itself
into poverty due to its inability to produce food proportional to a growing pop-
ulation in the face of a ﬁxed amount of arable land. More recently, many have
predicted the world running out of oil, coal, clean water, timber, arable land,
or other essential natural resources, with disastrous economic consequences.
While some scholars such as Ehrlich (1968) and Brown (2004) maintain that
the world is heading towards poverty due to the ﬁxedness of natural resources,
others such as Simon (1981) and Boserup (1965) argue natural resources pose
little if any restrictions on boundless economic growth.2
The extent to which ﬁxed factors constrain growth is not only important
to our future, but also to understanding our past. Many economists, including
Lee (1973), Valor (2005) and Clark (2007) argue that the history of world pop-
ulation before 1750 is well summarized by Malthusian population dynamics.
The role of ﬁxed factors in production is a crucial element of this theory. In ad-
dition, the nature of ﬁxed factors in these models aﬀects dynamics around the
Malthusian steady state. These dynamics are key in understanding the large
and active body of literature exploring the escape from the Malthusian steady
state and the takeoﬀ to modern growth in Europe during the 19th century
(see Lucas (1998), Valor and Weil (1999, 2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002),
Doepke (2004), Fernandez-Vilaverde (2005), Voth and Voigtländer (2010)).
Whether ﬁxed factors limit growth depends crucially on two variables. The
ﬁrst is the nature of productivity growth, and the second is the elasticity of
1By ﬁxed factors, I mean inputs to production whose quantities are extremely diﬃcult
to increase if they become scarce. This includes non-renewable resources which cannot be
replaced such as oil and coal, as well as arable land.
2A related issue is whether large quantities of natural resources hurt growth. Much
research has been devoted to the topic (Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 2001), Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2003), Leite and Weidmann (1999), Ross (2001), Alexeev and Conrad
(2009)), but this is a separate issue from the one described here. This paper focuses on
whether ﬁxed factors constrain growth directly via their dilution in the face of increasing
population.
2
substitution between ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors.
Productivity growth can help alleviate resource constraints in two ways.
First, any type of productivity growth can help overcome the constraining
eﬀects of a ﬁxed factor. Therefore, sustained income growth is possible even in
the presence of a ﬁxed factor given a high enough rate of productivity growth.
Predicting the future rate of productivity growth, however, is an extremely
diﬃcult if not impossible task, and I leave it for other work.
Secondly, the direction of innovation is important in overcoming resource
constraints. If productivity growth is not Hicks-neutral, then whether future
innovations are ﬁxed or non-ﬁxed factor saving is important. There are many
reasons to think that future productivity growth may take place in the ﬁxed
factor sector. Hicks (1932) introduced the concept of induced innovation, or
the tendency for new innovations to save on scarce resources. Many scholars
have tied this idea to ﬁxed-factor saving technological progress. Popp et al.
(2008) reviews recent literature on induced innovation in the context of energy
economics, noting the recent increase in renewable energy R&D as a response
to high oil and coal prices. The extent to which technological progress will be
ﬁxed-factor saving will inﬂuence the degree to which ﬁxed factors will hinder
growth.
To what extent non-ﬁxed factors such as labor, physical capital, and human
capital can be substituted for ﬁxed factors in production is also important
in inﬂuencing the extent to which ﬁxed factors impact economic dynamics.
A high elasticity of substitution between ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors allows
the marginal product of non-ﬁxed factors to fall more slowly as these factors
accumulate. This can lead to higher levels of income per capita given the same
ﬁxed factor endowment.
The value of this elasticity is especially important in two types of models
within economics. First, models of the eﬀect of population size on income
per capita can have diﬀerent outcomes depending on how substitutable ﬁxed
and non-ﬁxed factors are in production, since this elasticity will aﬀect the
intensity of the drag on income caused from congestion of the ﬁxed factor. For
example, models which estimate the gain in income via a health intervention
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which saves lives (Ashram et al (2008)) or fertility reductions (Ashram et al
(2010)) depend crucially on this elasticity.
The second type of models for which the elasticity of substitution plays
an important role are models of the the demographic transition and takeoﬀ
from Malthusian stagnation. The Cobb-Douglas production function, a highly
popular description of production technology among economists, implicitly
assumes the elasticity to be unity. Virtually every major study explaining
the Malthusian regime or the demographic transition has used an elasticity of
substitution of one (see Lucas (1998), Valor and Weil (2000), Stokey (2001),
Hansen and Prescott (2002), Doepke (2004), Voth and Voigtländer (2010)).
The elasticity of substitution can aﬀect a range of outcomes in these models,
such as the speed of the demographic transition, the level of pre-industrial
income, the speed by which factors shift from the agricultural to the industrial
sector, how intensely wages react to population shocks, how quickly wages fall
back to the Malthusian steady state after a productivity shock, steady state
levels of population density, and predictions of which countries should make
the demographic transition ﬁrst.
However, despite the importance of this parameter, there are few  if any
 reliable estimates of this elasticity. A few economists have attempted simple
analyses within larger papers on other topics where this elasticity mattered,
but no serious attempt has been made at its estimation. A common method
used to estimate this elasticity is to regress shares of income paid to factors
of production (or alternatively the rental rate paid to factors of production)
on factor quantities. However, since these factor quantities are endogenous to
their rental rates, these estimates are not well identiﬁed. In addition, data
on factor shares are notoriously diﬃcult to quantify, leading to imprecise esti-
mates.
The ﬁrst attempt was by Nordhaus and Tobin (1972), who used data on
shares of income paid to land and labor from the U.S. in the ﬁrst half of the
20th century and ﬁnd that the elasticity of substitution is about 2. However,
they only use 10 observations, and therefore they cannot estimate the elasticity
4
with any certainty3.
The most cited estimate is from Hayami and Ruttan (1985), who look
at a cross section of the agricultural sector in 30 developed countries and
test whether the elasticity is unity and fail to reject. However, they do not
measure the elasticity of ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors, but rather the elasticity
of labor and all other factors, then make the assumption that land is the only
factor. This is a diﬃcult assumption to make, since capital is heavily used
in agriculture in the developed world. Their study also suﬀers from a small
sample size and poor identiﬁcation.
Given the paucity of good estimates for the elasticity, recently Ashram,
Lester, and Weil (2008) use data on the natural resource share in national
income from Caselli and Feyrer (2007) for estimation. They ﬁnd a value of 2.35
and can reject unity. While an improvement over previous studies in regards
to sample size, Ashram et al rely heavily on imputed data. First, they use
imputed data on land's share of income from Caselli and Feyrer (2007). They
also impute the quantity of the ﬁxed factor rather than measuring it directly,
due to the fact that there is no obvious unit of measure for ﬁxed factors.
Finally, there is no attempt to overcome the endogeneity issues mentioned
previously.
Weil and Wilde (2009) improve upon the work of Ashram et al. by using a
set of indicators on natural resource stock per capita, and use instruments for
income. Depending on the model speciﬁcation, they ﬁnd an elasticity which
varies from 1.5 to 5, with most of the estimates being around two.
To estimate this elasticity, all of these studies above measure how the
share of national income paid to ﬁxed-factors (or alternatively the rental rate)
changes as non-ﬁxed factors accumulate. However, none of the studies accounts
for the fact that in an open economy, factor price ratios across countries tend
to equalize to the world rate (Ohlin (1933), Stolper and Samuelson (1941),
Williamson (1999, 2000a, 2000b)). Therefore, the estimation will be biased
upward, since the observed change in factor rent ratios should be zero (or at
least smaller than they would be in autarky) as non-ﬁxed factors accumulate
3Nordhaus and Tobin fail to reject the elasticity is ∞, but also fail to reject 1.
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in an open economy. This implies that the estimation of the elasticity of
substitution between ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors is better achieved in closed
economies.
In addition, the most useful estimates of the elasticity of substitution will
come from economies in which ﬁxed factors play an important role  namely
developing countries. If we truly want to use an estimate of the elasticity
which is useful in explaining the transition from an agricultural economy to
an industrial one, or to explain how diﬀering elasticities of substitution may
change growth dynamics or the eﬀect of population size on income per capita
in the developing world, it would be nice to estimate this elasticity for a set
of agrarian economies.
In this paper, I estimate this elasticity of substitution in a closed, agrarian
economy  pre-industrial England from 1200-1750. I use changes in labor
supply via population size using data on factor rents from Clark (2007) in a
simple CES framework. As in the previous literature, my estimation strategy
relies on regressing factor rents on factor quantities (speciﬁcally I regress the
ratio of land rents to wages on the land labor ratio) to uncover the elasticity of
substitution. However, I overcome the issue of endogeneity by instrumenting
for the land-labor ratio with the timing of plagues in England. As I show
below, the timing of plague deaths is likely an exogenous source of variation
in population levels, and can be traced back to speciﬁc exogenous events such
as the arrival of a ship ﬁlled with plague-laden rats from an external port.
In addition to my estimation of the elasticity of substitution between ﬁxed
and non-ﬁxed factors, my methodology also allows me to estimate the degree
of factor-induced productivity growth. If technological progress is induced,
that implies the land-labor ratio should not only eﬀect the level of the ratio
of factor rents via the elasticity of substitution, but also their growth rate
via a changing ratio of factor-speciﬁc productivities. Using a model which
incorporates both of these eﬀects, I can control for and quantify both of these
phenomena. This study is the ﬁrst to my knowledge which can put a number
on the extent to which induced innovation occurred in pre-industrial England.
Finally, I look at how my results for the elasticity of substitution and
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induced innovation impact well known economic models. These models fall
into two categories. First, I construct a simple model of a Malthusian economy
and show that the elasticity of substitution aﬀects the speed by which wages
and population converge to their steady state levels after a technology or
mortality shock. I then analyze how a small elasticity of substitution would
change dynamics in models of the transition from the Malthusian steady state
to modern growth such as Valor and Weil (1999, 2000), Hansen and Prescott
(2002), Voth and Voigtländer (2010), and Stokey (2001). Second, I analyze
how the elasticity of substitution would aﬀect models of the eﬀect of population
size on development levels generally.
I ﬁnd that the elasticity of substitution between land and other factors
over this period in England was about 0.6. This implies that the elasticity of
substitution is much smaller than previously thought (or at least modeled),
since most models addressing the issue of population and the demographic
transition implicitly assume an elasticity of 1. This is a novel ﬁnding, because
the share of income paid to land has been falling since at least the early 1900s
(at least in the developed world), which is generally a result of an elasticity of
substitution greater than one.
This implies that any short-run deviations of population size and income
from their Malthusian steady state were shorter and smaller than previously
modeled. In addition, since I estimate the elasticity of substitution over a long
period (550 years), this implies that the elasticity I am measuring is a long-
run elasticity. In the short run, this elasticity must have been even smaller,
implying that land was even more constraining of a factor over shorter periods
of time, such as an individual's lifetime.
I also ﬁnd evidence for factor-biased technological change. Speciﬁcally, I
ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the annual growth rates of land- and labor-
augmenting productivity was 0.10% higher per million persons  implying
higher populations and therefore higher population densities induced innova-
tion towards land-saving technologies. This implies that a doubling of popu-
lation density in England from its year 1500 level raises the diﬀerence in the
growth rates of land- and labor-enhancing productivity by 0.22% per year.
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Many economic historians have pointed to the fact that technological changes
which occurred over this period appeared to be induced, but this is the ﬁrst
study to empirically test and quantify the phenomenon.
I also ﬁnd that smaller elasticities of substitution slow down the escape from
Malthusian stagnation in models which depend on achieving a certain level of
population to transition (such as Valor and Weil (1999, 2000)) and in models
which rely on shifting production away from the agricultural sector due to
biased technological progress (such as Hansen and Prescott (2002)). However,
I ﬁnd that small elasticities of substitution should lead to faster transitions
in models which rely on achieving a certain level of income to escape from
the Malthusian steady state (such as Voth and Voigtländer (2010) and Stokey
(2001)).
Finally, I ﬁnd that smaller elasticities of substitution imply population size
has a larger negative eﬀect on income. Interventions in developing countries
which aﬀect population size can have widely varying results based on the elas-
ticity of substitution. For example, a health intervention which both saves
lives and increases worker productivity could have a positive or negative eﬀect
on income depending on the elasticity of substitution. In addition, the elastic-
ity can impact the beneﬁt to an intervention to reduce fertility to have a large
or small eﬀect.
The paper continues as follows: Section 2 outlines my basic model and
results. Section 3 augments the model to account for biased technological
progress and provides results. Section 4 looks at the implications of diﬀerent
elasticities of substitution in economic models. Section 5 concludes. In addi-
tion, the appendix details the data on the timing of national plague epidemics
in pre-industrial England.
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2 Model with Hicks-Neutral Technology
Consider the following constant elasticity of substitution production function
introduced by Arrow, Chenery, Minhas, and Solow (1961),
Yt = At [(ψXt)
ρ + ((1− ψ)Nt)ρ]
1
ρ , (1)
where Xt is a ﬁxed factor, Nt is a non-ﬁxed factor, Yt is output, and At is
total factor productivity, and ψ ∈ (0, 1) is a scale parameter, and t indexes
time. Notice that technology in this case is Hicks-neutral. Later in the paper
I will relax the assumption of Hicks-neutral technology, which will allow me
to estimate the magnitude of induced innovation.
The elasticity of substitution between Xt and Nt is
σ =
1
1− ρ.
Taking the ratio of the marginal products of Xt and Nt (denoted r
X
t and r
N
t ),
and taking logs yields
ln
(
rXt
rNt
)
= − 1
σ
ln
(
ψ
1− ψ
)
− 1
σ
ln
(
Xt
Nt
)
. (2)
Therefore, in principle I can estimate the elasticity of substitution between
ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors by regressing the log ratio of ﬁxed factor rent and
wages on a constant and the land-labor ratio.
There are several diﬃculties in estimating this equation directly. First, the
quantities of X and N are potentially endogenous to their rental rates, and
therefore estimation via OLS can yield biased results. Second, data on the
quantity of factors in the economy are diﬃcult to measure, especially in the
historical context, and therefore may lead to attenuation bias in estimation.
Third, there is no obvious unit of measure to combine diﬀerent types of natural
resources to create a value for the ﬁxed factor stock Xt.
4
4The most logical solution  to convert the value of the stock of each resource into dollar
terms to obtain the total value of X  is incorrect since resource values are obtained by
merely capitalizing the stream of resource rents. Therefore, the dependent and independent
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Measurement issues are especially acute in the context of pre-industrial
England, since there is little, if any, data on land use, capital stocks and rents,
human capital attainment, or even labor force back to 1200. Therefore, I make
two assumptions to simplify the baseline analysis:
1. The total endowment of natural resources, Xt, is constant over the entire
sample.
2. The only non-ﬁxed factor in the economy is labor, and labor is a ﬁxed
fraction of the population. Put mathematically, Nt = Lt = ψPt, where
Pt and Lt are population and labor supply respectively at time t.
The ﬁrst assumption side-steps the problem of measuring ﬁxed resources. This
allows Xt = X¯ to become part of the constant term in my regression equation.
The second assumption allows me to use data on factors I can easily acquire
for the period 1200-1750  namely population, wages, and land rents  while
forgetting about physical and human capital and their returns. Later in this
section I will discuss each assumption and analyze what happens when it is
relaxed.
Given these assumptions, we can rewrite (6) as:
ln
(
rt
wt
)
= α +
1
σ
ln (Pt) , (3)
where α = − 1
σ
ln( ψ
1−ψ )− 1σ ln(X¯), wt is the wage, and rt is land rent.
2.1 Basic Data and OLS Results
The data on factor rents (wages and land rent) come from Clark (2001, 2002,
2007b)5. The unit of observation is the decade. Clark's land rental income
series is based on several data sets. For the period 1200-1500, he mainly
uses manorial accounts and manor court records which record income from
leases for a landholder (see Clark (2001) for more details). This is beneﬁcial
variables would measure the same thing, and the estimates would be biased.
5Since land was the main ﬁxed factor in pre-industrial England, I use the rental rate on
land as a proxy for the rental rate of ﬁxed factors
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since his series is mostly based on actual transactions of land rentals rather
than imputed from land prices, although some land price data is used for
the period 1200-1320. For 1500-1870, he uses rental values of lands from
charitable trusts. Although each of these samples are geographically diverse,
they are not nationally representative since more densely populated areas will
have disproportionately more data. Therefore, Clark calculates a national rent
index by applying weights for regions, plot size, amount of common land, type
of land (farmland, meadow, etc.) and population densities (see Clark (2002)
for more details).6
Nominal wages are determined by similar records on payments to hired
farmhands and builders, which are converted to real terms by adjusting by the
cost of a bundle of agricultural goods. The data and methods Clark uses to
obtain this series are too detailed to be outlined in full here, but can be found
in Clark (2007b). The data for population are also from Clark, who in turn
used Wrigley et al (1997) for 1540-1870, and Hatcher (1977), Poos (1991), and
Hallam (1988) for 1200-1540.
Figure 1 plots the wage and land rent series over time, in addition to
the capital rent series from Clark which will be introduced and used later.
Figure 2 plots the ratio of land rents to wages from Figure 1 to form a time
series of our dependent variable. This is contrasted with population size, our
independent variable of interest. It is immediately clear that the two series
follow each other quite closely for the period 1200-1750. This is especially
evident around 1348, when the Black Death sharply lowered population  the
ratio of rental rates immediately followed. In the late 18th century, however,
the relationship breaks down as population and factor prices begin to explode
with the beginning of the industrial revolution.
It has been widely noted that the Malthusian model of the economy broke
down as soon as Malthus wrote it. Not only did wages explode despite pop-
ulation growth, but factor prices began to be driven by forces other than
population density, such as trade. O'Rourke and Williamson (2005) note that
6Clark graciously provided me with a revised version of his rental rate data from 1200-
1800. Therefore, data I use may diﬀer slightly from the published version.
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after the beginning of the industrial revolution, factor rents across the globe
(but especially in England) tended to equalize to a world rate. With the ex-
pansion of overseas trade in the 18th and 19th century, the assumption of a
closed economy becomes less palatable. In addition, the fundamental changes
in the British economy make it diﬃcult to believe the elasticity of substitution
was the same before and after the industrial revolution. For all these reasons,
I cut the sample at 1750.
In table 1, column 1, I estimate equation (3) using OLS, and ﬁnd that the
elasticity of substitution is 0.718, and signiﬁcantly less than one.7 As men-
tioned earlier, this is a surprising result, since most contemporary estimates
of the elasticity of substitution ﬁnd that it is greater than one. In column 2, I
add a time trend, and the estimate falls slightly to 0.695. Later when I relax
the assumption of Hick-neutral technology growth, this time trend will take
on economic signiﬁcance, as will be discussed in section 2.3.
Figure 3 shows a residual plot of the regression in column 2 of Table 1.
A residual plot is a useful way of showing the partial correlation between two
variables in a multivariate regression, and is useful to see if the regression coef-
ﬁcient on a particular variable is driven by outliers.8 The relationship between
the ratio of land rents to wages and population is positive and very strong. As
a result, the estimate of the elasticity of substitution has an extremely small
standard error. It is also interesting to note that over a 550-year span, the
relationship remained very stable. One might expect that over the 550 year
span of the sample something fundamental changed in the English economy
regarding the importance of ﬁxed resources and land  so it is remarkable
to note that the relationship between factor rents and population was almost
exactly the same in 1750 as it was in 1200.
7All OLS estimates use Newey-West standard errors with one lag since there is a large
degree of autocorrelation in the pure OLS residuals.
8Procedure for explaining how to obtain a residual plot will be explained in the note to
Figure 3.
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2.2 Instrument and 2SLS Results
There are two potential sources of bias in the above analysis. First, there is the
issue of measurement error given the historical nature of the data. Estimates
of medieval populations in general vary greatly, since they are usually based
on a small subset of villages for which data exists and then extrapolated to
the country as a whole. More accurate data on population based on family
reconstruction are available only after 1541 (see Wrigley et al (1997)).
Even though this paper attempts to correctly quantify the elasticity of
substitution between ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors, a major contribution of the
paper is a qualitative one  that the elasticity of substitution was signiﬁcantly
less than unity. Therefore, if I ﬁnd a statistical problem in my estimation,
determining the direction of bias may strengthen or undermine that conclusion.
In the case of measurement error, it strengthens my qualitative results that the
elasticity of substitution is less than one. To see this, notice that the elasticity
is the inverse of coeﬃcient on log population. Therefore, since measurement
error will cause attenuation bias to the coeﬃcient on log population, this
implies that the inverse will be biased upward. Therefore, the true elasticity
will be even smaller than I estimate.
Secondly, there is concern about the exogeneity of population changes. In
the standard Malthusian model, higher wages should lead to higher population
growth, and low wages should lead to population decline.
Both statistical problems can be solved by using an instrument. In this
paper, I use the timing of plagues in England as an instrument for population.
In particular, I use the series of plagues known collectively as the Second
Pandemic.
The Second Pandemic began in approximately 1346. It originated in Cen-
tral Asia and ultimately aﬀected the entire Afro-Eurasian continent. Although
accurate estimates are diﬃcult to obtain, it has been estimated that this ﬁrst
wave of the second Pandemic, commonly referred to as the Black Death, killed
half of the inhabitants of China, a third of Europe, and an eight of Africa. It
was introduced into Europe in 1357 when Mongol armies besieging the Crimean
city of Caﬀa catapulted infected corpses over the city wall in an attempt of
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biological warfare. The remaining inhabitants of the city ﬂed to Sicily, from
which the plague spread into the rest of Europe.
The plague arrived in England via a ship from Gascony in southwestern
France to Weymouth shortly before 24 June, 1348. From Weymouth, the dis-
ease spread rapidly across the southwest of England, hitting Bristol ﬁrst and
reaching London in the fall. The spread of the disease slowed in the winter,
but the next spring spread across all southern England and into the north. It
reached York in May, and spread quickly over all of northern England during
the rest of the summer, before dying out that winter. Although estimates dis-
agree, the Black Death killed between 25% and 60% of the English population.
The ﬁrst serious recurrence in England came in the years 1361-62, and
then again in 1369, with a death rate of approximately 10-20%. (Gottfried
(1983)) Over the following century the plague would return at intervals of ﬁve
to twelve years, with continuously smaller mortality. There was a resurgence in
severity between 1430 to 1480  the outbreak in 1471 took as much as 10-15%
of the population, while the death rate of the plague of 1479-80 could have
been as high as 20%.(Gottfried (1983)) From 1480, the outbreaks decreased in
frequency in England until the last great plague epidemic, the Great Plague
of London in 1665-66. On the European continent, plagues continued to occur
well into the 18th century.
There are three types of plague, which diﬀer in the location of infection
and vector of transmission. Each type of plague was present during the Black
Death, and was caused by the same bacterium, Yersinia pestis. First is the
bubonic plague, which aﬀects the lymph nodes. It was transmitted via infected
ﬂea bites, and was carried by plague-resistant rates. Second, the pneumonic
plague infected the lungs, and was transmitted through the air via tiny droplets
of infected ﬂuid. This form was especially deadly, since its main symptom was
coughing and could be spread human to human. Last was the septicemic
plague, which is spread through direct contact with infected tissue or bodily
ﬂuids, and infects the blood stream. Mortality from the plague was high,
ranging between 30% to 95% of those infected.9
9Earlier I make that assumption that labor supply is a constant fraction of the population.
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In Appendix A, I list every major national plague outbreak in England
during the Second Pandemic, starting with the Black Death (1348-1350) and
ending with the Great Plague of London (1665-1666). I can use the data in two
ways to create an instrument: First, I can use an indicator variable for whether
or not there was a national plague epidemic in that decade. Secondly, I can
accumulate the plague outbreaks to create the number of plague outbreaks in
the last 100 years. My empirical results will be similar using either instrument.
The key identifying assumption is that the timing of plague epidemics
were exogenous, and only aﬀect relative factor prices through their eﬀect on
labor supply. However, one may worry that the timing of the plagues were
endogenous to land scarcity, and therefore to its rental rate  which would
imply failure of the exclusion restriction. At the center of this view is the idea
that the plagues were a necessary and long overdue Malthusian correction of
population, which had reached or even exceeded its sustainable level.
Many historians, however, argue that is is not the case. (see Helleiner
(1950), Hallam (1972), Herlihy (1997), Poos (1985), Chavas and Bromley
(2005). Hatcher and Bailey (2001) provides a further review.). These schol-
ars argue that the Black Death could not have been caused by a Malthusian
crisis for several reasons. First, they argue that the halt in rapid population
growth preceding the Black Death was not due to land scarcity, but rather
due to weather and climatic shocks. Before the Black Death, the popula-
tion of England increased rapidly from 2 million in 1000 A.D. to 6 million
in 1317, indicative of non-scarcity of land. In 1315-1322, England suﬀered a
period of massive and generalized crop failures due to very extreme and rare
weather conditions (Kershaw (1973)), otherwise known as the Great Famine.
In addition, in 1319 there was a severe cattle plague which destroyed draught
One may worry that this may not be the case during the Black Death for two reasons. First,
labor supply per person may fall due to morbidity caused by the plague. This does not
seem to be the case, as the plague generally killed those infected within a week. Second,
the fraction of the population working may change if the Black Death disproportionately
aﬀected certain age groups. This also does not seem to be the case  mortality rates for all
age groups and social classes were similar. However, mortality rates were particularly high
for some occupations, such as monks and priests who directly cared for the infected and
dead.
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animals and lowered agricultural productivity. This famine led to increases
in crime, displacement, and social upheaval, reducing population through the
1330s. These scholars argue that without these weather shocks, population
likely would have continued to grow rapidly, implying there was no Malthu-
sian crisis.10
Secondly, food prices were quite low on the eve of the Black Death, further
indicating land was not scarce. In addition, the ratio of land rents to wages
was constant for the 150 years before the Black Death, whereas increasing
population pressure would have implied a rising ratio. Third, they argue the
plague timing was truly random since it hit all of Europe simultaneously, even
the countries whose populations which had much diﬀerent dynamics and land-
labor ratios than England. The Black Death, they argue, would have been
just as deadly whether or not there were population pressures, and therefore
the fact that population dropped dramatically is not a proof that England was
above a sustainable level of population.
Finally, the timing of plagues were not consistent with the theory of when
plagues should occur. If Malthusian pressures caused the plagues, then more
plagues should occur when population is high, and less when population is low.
In reality, we see the exact opposite happening  national plague epidemics
were most frequent precisely when population was its lowest. In addition,
Herlihy (1997) argues that the Black Death came too late if it were caused by
population pressures, since population in 1348 was well oﬀ its peak. After the
Black Death population remained low for 300 years, but plagues continued to
occur.
Since many of the plagues can be tied to speciﬁc events, such as a rat-laden
ship arriving in a port, it is highly plausible that they were exogenous shocks
to population. It may be possible, however, that the intensity of plagues when
they strike could be aﬀected by land scarcity. A population which faces severe
overcrowding and population pressures may be more susceptible to disease.
However, I avoid these problems by not using data on plague intensity, but
10In fact, Campbell (1984) ﬁnds evidence that population did continue to increase in spite
of the Great Hunger and its subsequent unrest.
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rather plague timing.11
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 are the results of the 2SLS regression of equa-
tion (3) with each instrument. When using the number of plagues in the last
100 years as an instrument, I estimate the elasticity of substitution between
ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors to be 0.630. This is slightly smaller than the OLS
estimate, which we should expect to be the case due to measurement error.
Similarly, using the plague indicator as an instrument, I ﬁnd the elasticity of
substitution to be 0.683. The F-test on the ﬁrst stage instrument coeﬃcient
in each regression are 18.34 and 22.04 for plagues in the last 100 years and the
plague indicator respectively.
Columns 5 and 6 repeat the analysis with a time trend. The results are
similar, with the elasticity of substitution being 0.693 when I use the number
of plagues in the last 100 years as the instrument, and 0.695 for the plague
indicator. The ﬁrst stage regressions are stronger in this case, with F-statistics
of 126.29 and 33.2. This ﬁnding that the elasticity of substitution is less than
one has many implications, and will be discussed further in section 4.
2.3 Robustness and Biases
Up to this point, I have used a simple model to estimate the elasticity of substi-
tution. However, one may worry about the validity of several key assumptions.
This section will calculate the direction of bias in my estimates when relaxing
these assumptions, as well as present robustness checks.
Fixedness of land
I assume that the total endowment of natural resources, Xt, is constant over
the entire sample. There are two possible issues with this assumption. First,
one may worry that population pressure induced land use to change. However,
11One may wonder whether repeated plague outbreaks were in fact the same outbreak,
where the bacteria lie dormant in the population, and manifested itself when population
pressure became large. However, this possibility is ruled out by the biology of the plague
itself as will be discussed later. In short, outbreaks tended to be short and intense, with
mortality rates too high, and the duration and incubation period of the plague were too
short, to have been dormant in the population.
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it is important to realize that Clark's land rent series is not solely based on
cropland rents. Rather, it is a national rent index over many diﬀerent types of
land uses, such as arable land, meadow, marsh, pasture, or mixed use. As long
as national borders don't change, the overall amount of land available for use in
any type of production remains the same. Since I use an aggregate production
function, whether natural resources change between uses is irrelevant to the
quantity of natural resources in the economy.
Second, the overall amount of land available for use in any type of produc-
tion may be changing due to land reclamation, soil depletion, or erosion. There
is a large literature detailing the history of land reclamation, such as the drain-
ing of the fen in eastern England or deforestation. If the amount of available
land increased over the sample period, this could bias our estimates.
We can determine the direction of bias that would result if the assumption
of a constant endowment of ﬁxed factors were violated. Assume that rising
population densities increases the amount of land used in the production of
goods. This implies a positive correlation between Pt and Xt, meaning the
land/labor ratio would change less in response to population growth than if
Xt were ﬁxed. Therefore, the coeﬃcient on Pt in regression (3) would be
underestimated under the assumption of a ﬁxed X.12 Since σ is the inverse of
the coeﬃcient on Pt, the estimated elasticity would be too large. Therefore,
although changing Xt may bias my estimate of σ, it actually strengthens my
qualitative argument that the elasticity is less than one.
The opposite would be true if resource depletion were an issue. If resource
depletion implied a negative correlation between Pt and Xt, then the estimated
elasticity would be too small. My qualitative result depends on which eﬀect
was larger, the land reclamation eﬀect, or the land depletion eﬀect. As stated
above, the facts suggest that land reclamation was increased the total amount
of land available for production, and therefore my estimates for σ are too large
 strengthening my argument that the elasticity was less than one.
12By underestimate I mean in absolute value.
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Labor as the only Non-ﬁxed Factor
I assume that the only factors of production are land and labor in this economy.
What about capital, both human and physical? In this section, I extend the
model to account for additional non-ﬁxed factors of production. First, I add
just physical capital to the model by allowing Nt in equation (1) become a
capital-labor composite factor, Nt = K
δ
tL
1−δ
t . From CES production function,
I derive the following relationship between L and K:
K =
δ
1− δL
rL
rK
Substituting this into Nt above results in the following regression equation:
ln
(
rXt
)
= α +
1
σ
ln (Pt) + ζ1 ln (wt) + ζ2 ln
(
rKt
)
. (4)
This is the same as equation (3), without assuming ζ1 = 1, and controlling
for the wage and rental rate on capital in the regression. By extension, I can
control for the presence of any non-ﬁxed factor in the composite factor Nt by
simply controlling for its rate of return.13
Clark (2001, 2002, 2007b) provides data on the rental rate of capital rK in
addition to the data on wages and land rents. He uses documents transferring
property by gift or sale to a religious house  or cartularies  which include
information on rental payments to capital to calculate capital's rate of return.
Human capital is omitted from the model for two reasons. First, data on
human capital over this period are diﬃcult to obtain. Data on any indicator
of human capital (education levels, literacy rates, rates of return to education,
etc.) are not available back to 1200. However, some data does exist for the
latter part of the sample, and they indicate that levels of human capital during
the middle ages were quite low. Literacy rates for males in England reached
25% only after 1600, and were even lower for females. Even after the industrial
revolution started, educational attainment remained low. For example, the
13This statement holds if the composite factor N is of Cobb-Douglas form. If not, then
the rates of return would need to be controlled for in a non-linear fashion.
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fraction of children 5-14 enrolled in primary eduction did not exceed 10% until
after 1850 (Flora et al (1983)).
Secondly, since the existing evidence points to a low level of human capital
before the industrial revolution, it likely wasn't an important factor of pro-
duction. Valor (2005) argues that even during the ﬁrst phase of the industrial
revolution, human capital had a limited role in the production process since
factory work did not require literacy.
I estimate equation (4) in table 3. Column 1 reports a simple OLS regres-
sion with a time trend but without controlling for capital. Columns 2 and 3
are 2SLS estimates of the same regression using each of the two instruments.
The results are similar to the simple OLS regression obtained in table 1.
Columns 4-6 repeat the previous exercise while controlling for capital. The
estimated elasticity rises from about 0.6 to 0.8, depending on the speciﬁcation.
While the elasticity is still less than one, I can no longer reject that it is equal to
one. This is problematic for my qualitative conclusion in the previous sections
that the elasticity of substitution is less than one. However, as we will see in
the next section, when I control for factor induced technical change in the next
section, the estimated elasticity of substitution will fall back to its previous
level of about 0.6, and be signiﬁcantly less than one (see columns 7-9).
Labor as a Constant Fraction of Population
I assume that labor is a ﬁxed fraction of the population. However, it is possible
that labor force participation rates changed as a result of the Black Death. For
example, high wages after the Black Death may have induced more labor into
the market. Many scholars, including Voigtländer and Voth (2010b) note that
female labor force participation increased after the Black Death in response to
higher wages, labor scarcity, the change in production from grain to pastoral
goods, and increased demand for pastoral products.
Just as before, we can determine the direction of bias if labor supply was
not a constant fraction of population. Suppose that labor supply per person
increased when population was low and decreased when population was high.
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This implies that ﬂuctuations in population overstate the true change in labor
supply, and therefore the coeﬃcient on population will be underestimated.
This implies σ will be overestimated  further strengthening my ﬁnding that
σ < 1.
3 Biased Technological Progress and Induced In-
novation
In previous sections I have assumed that technology is Hicks-neutral. I now
consider the following CES production function with factor-speciﬁc technolo-
gies AX and AN :
Yt =
[(
AXt X
)ρ
+
(
ANt N
)ρ] 1ρ , (5)
This is the same as before, except now productivity is not Hicks-neutral, but
rather is factor speciﬁc. Following the analysis and making the same assump-
tions as in Section 2, this results in the following regression equation:
ln
(
rt
wt
)
= α− 1
σ
ln
(
AXt
ALt
)
+
1
σ
ln (Pt) . (6)
In addition to diﬃculties estimating the regression model as mentioned in
section 2, we now have AXt and A
L
t , which will aﬀect the factor rent ratio, but
which are unobserved. Since the ratio of factor speciﬁc technology ln
(
AXt
ALt
)
is
unknown, it acts as an omitted variable and therefore will bias the estimation
of σ if ln
(
AXt
ALt
)
is correlated with the land-labor ratio. The theory of induced
innovation implies that the growth rate of
AXt
ALt
should be higher if the land-
labor ratio is low, so it is unclear whether the level of
AXt
ALt
should be correlated
with Xt
Lt
.
However, I can attempt to control for factor-induced productivity growth
by modeling it more explicitly. Assume that the growth rates of AX and AL
(gX and gL respectively) vary depending on the land/labor ratio, such that
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when land is scare (i.e. when population is high), gX will be high and gL will
be low. We can rewrite ln
(
AXt
ALt
)
as:
ln
(
AXt
ALt
)
= ln
AXt−1
(
1 + gXt (Pt)
)
ALt−1 (1 + gLt (Pt))
 = ln [AXt−1
ALt−1
(1 + gt(Pt))
]
,
where gt =
(1+gXt (Pt))
(1+gLt (Pt))
− 1, ∂gt
dPt
> 0.14 By iterating this equation and using the
approximation that ln (1 + x) ≈ x, we can express the level of ln
(
AXt
ALt
)
into an
initial condition and the sum of previous growth rates:
ln
(
AXt
ALt
)
≈ ln
(
AX0
AL0
)
+
t∑
i=1
gi(Pi).
The true functional form of g (Pt) is unknown. I use a linear speciﬁcation in
my estimation, gt = γ + θPt. This implies:
ln
(
AXt
ALt
)
≈ ln
(
AX0
AL0
)
+ γt+ θ
t∑
i=1
(Pi).
Plugging back into the regression equation we have:
ln
(
rt
wt
)
= α− 1
σ
γt− 1
σ
θ
t∑
i=1
(Pi) +
1
σ
ln (Pt) , (7)
where α = ln
(
AX0
AL0
)
− 1
σ
ln(X¯). These assumptions lead me to the following
regression equation:
ln
(
rt
wt
)
= α + β1t+ β2
t∑
i=1
(Pi) + β3 ln (Pt) , (8)
where we can recover the parameters of interest γ, θ, and σ from the βs.
Speciﬁcally, γ = −β1
β3
, θ = −β2
β3
and σ = 1
β3
.
In the previous section, I alluded to the fact that the time trend in the
14Note that gt ≈ gX − gL.
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regressions in Table 1 had meaning. In a world with no induced innovation
(θ = 0), the time trend will allow us to recover the average diﬀerence between
land-speciﬁc and labor-speciﬁc innovation over the sample period. The term∑t
i=1(Pi), or the sum of past levels of population, allows us to determine the
amount of induced innovation. This is easier to see if I rewrite equation (8) in
diﬀerences:
4 ln
(
rt
wt
)
= β1 + β2Pt + β34 ln (Pt) , (9)
Equation (9) states that the change in the ratio of factor rents is aﬀected not
only by the change in the land-labor ratio, but also the level of the land-labor
ratio itself via its eﬀect on
AXt
ALt
through induced innovation.
In the simple regression model without controlling for induced innovation,
I used plague deaths as an instrument for population. When I include induced
innovation in equation (8), population now enters the equation twice  both
in the level of population and in the sum of past levels of population. In order
to correctly identify the parameters, I now use two instruments  plagues for
the current level of Pt and the sum of past plagues for
∑t
i=1 Pt. In the results
that follow, I will therefore report two F-stats for the ﬁrst stage regression,
corresponding to the joint signiﬁcance of the instruments in each of the ﬁrst
stage regressions.
I estimate both the levels equation (8) and the diﬀerences equation (9) in
Table 2. Column 1 repeats the simple OLS regression from Table 1 with a time
trend and controlling for induced innovation. The elasticity of substitution is
about 2/3, almost identical to the estimates in table 1. When using 2SLS with
each instrument, the elasticity becomes smaller but qualitatively similar to the
OLS regression.
The estimates for implied γ estimate the growth rate of AX
AN
if population
were zero. In the OLS regression in column 1, I estimate that γ is -0.163%,
implying that technological progress would be labor saving. This is intuitive
 if population is low, labor would be scarce, and innovation would be labor
saving. For the 2SLS regression in columns 2 and 3, the estimates are -0.302%
and -0.361%. This is about double the size of the coeﬃcient in the OLS case.
23
The implied θs show the degree of induced innovation  the extent to which
the level of population inﬂuences the growth rate of the ratio of factor prices.
A positive coeﬃcient implies that higher populations lead to faster growth in
AX
AN
. In other words, the diﬀerence in the growth rate of land and labor speciﬁc
productivities, gX − gN , was larger when population was higher. This implies
that innovation was induced to be relatively land saving, since land was the
scarce factor when population was high.
In column 1 (the OLS regression), I estimate that θ was 0.051%. This
means that for each million people in England, gX − gN was 0.051% higher.
When I instrument for population in columns 2 and 3, the estimate approxi-
mately doubles to about 0.1% per year. Since the overall growth rate in AX
AN
is equal to γ + θPt, we can calculate the population at which gX and gN grew
at the same rate by from −γ
θ
. In each of the regression is columns 1-3, I cal-
culate this value to be between 3.2-3.4 million inhabitants. Above this value,
higher population densities induced innovation to be land saving, and below
this value technology was relatively labor saving.
Figures 6 uses these estimates to demonstrate how AX
AN
evolved from 1200-
1750. The OLS estimates imply a smaller rate of induced innovation, and
therefore AX
AN
responds less drastically to changes in population. The level of
AX
AN
is about 25% higher in 1750 than in 1200. The 2SLS estimates should an
increase of about 40% over the same time frame, and large changes induced by
population.15 Figure 7 shows how the overall growth rate of AX
AN
evolved over
the period for the two diﬀerent sets of estimates. For the OLS estimates, it
reaches about 0.13% per year in 1300, to a low of about -0.04% in the 1500s,
back to about 0.14% in 1700. For comparison, the 2SLS estimates show a
growth rate of .21% in 1300, -0.10% in 1500, and .25% in 1750.
In columns 4 and 5 of table 2 I estimate the same regression in diﬀerences.
The elasticity of substitution is insigniﬁcantly greater than 1 in the simple OLS
regression. This is surprising, since I obtained an elasticity of substitution
of signiﬁcantly less than 1 in every regression thus far. However, when I
15The 2SLS estimates refer to those obtained in column 2, using the number of plagues
in the last 100 years as an instrument.
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instrument for population the value of σ falls back to its usual levels (although
the standard error is still quite high such that I cannot reject an elasticity of
1).
As mentioned above in section 2.3, I re-estimate the augmented model with
capital in columns 7-9 of table 3. Column 7 shows the OLS result controlling
for technical change, while columns 8-9 show the estimates with each of the
two instruments. The elasticity of substitution is slightly lower than before,
from 0.583 in the OLS speciﬁcation to 0.429 in one of the 2SLS regressions.
The amount of implied induced innovation is the exact same in the two OLS
equations at 0.051% per million people. However, in the 2SLS regression, the
degree of induced innovation is slightly smaller when capital is included, down
to 0.077% from 0.090%.
4 Implications of the Elasticity of Substitution
In this section, I will explain the signiﬁcance of the ﬁnding that the elasticity
of substitution between ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors is less than one. Under
the assumption of diminishing marginal returns, the marginal product of any
factor of production must fall as the quantity of that factor accumulates. The
elasticity of substitution between factors inﬂuences the degree to which this
marginal product falls. If the elasticity is small, then the marginal product
falls faster as more of the given factor is added, and vice versa.
So why does this matter? The degree to which factor prices change as their
quantities change greatly eﬀect the dynamics of a large number of economic
models. For example, the speed by which wages fall as population grows has
large implications in models of population's eﬀect on output. In this section,
I will show how this elasticity eﬀects two types of models where population
matters.
First, many economists have been interested recently in the dynamics of
Malthusian economies. Lee (1973) was among the ﬁrst to estimate a model
of dynamics around the Malthusian steady state. More recently, Ashram and
Valor (2011) develop a model of the Malthusian economy and test the model's
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predictions using historical data on income and population size. In addition,
there has been a large and active literature recently on understanding the
transition from the Malthusian steady state to modern growth. Others have
also used Malthusian models to help understand the causes of the Great Di-
vergence.16
Models of Malthusian economies rely on the fact that in the presence of
a ﬁxed factor, gains in population depress wages. When positive technology
shocks occur, the subsequent increase in income per capita will only be ﬂeet-
ing, since future population growth will eventually lower wages back to the
Malthusian steady state. The speed by which income falls back to the steady
state is a direct reﬂection of the elasticity of substitution between land and
labor. Therefore, the predictions of many models of the takeoﬀ to growth from
the Malthusian steady state will be aﬀected by the elasticity of substitution.
Second, the extent to which population levels aﬀect output is a very old
question within economics, having been discussed at least since Malthus (1798).
While some scholars such as Ehrlich (1968) have argued that continued pop-
ulation growth will lead to economic crises and immiseration, others such as
Simon (1981) and Boserup (1965) submit that population growth is not a
problem. Both sides of the issue agree that the direct eﬀect of population
on income is negative in the presence of a ﬁxed factor. What they disagree
on, however, is the degree of substitutability of other factors for the ﬁxed fac-
tor, and the ability to innovate away from resource constraints. For example,
Boserup maintained that crop intensiﬁcation would occur in the face of pop-
ulation pressure, leading to proportional increases in food production. This is
just another way of saying the elasticity of substitution between ﬁxed and non-
ﬁxed factors is low. Simon advocated the idea that people are the ultimate
resource, and that large populations would increase the rate of technological
progress.
Larger populations cause resource per capita to shrink. If the elasticity of
16See Lucas (1998, 2002), Valor and Weil (1999, 2000), Stokey (2001), Valor Moav (2002),
Hansen and Prescott (2002), Lagerlof (2003, 2006), Doepke (2004), Fernandez-Vilaverde
(2005), O'Rourke, Rahman, and Taylor (2008), Strulik and Weisdorf (2008), and Voth and
Voigtländer (2010), among others.
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substitution is low, additional labor does little to increase production, leading
to lower average products and smaller incomes per capita. Population size
will have a larger negative eﬀect on income levels. Therefore, models which
predict the eﬀect of population on output must be eﬀected by this elasticity. In
addition, the eﬃcacy of programs intending to raise income per capita which
also change population size will depend on this elasticity.
The following section will demonstrate the eﬀect of the elasticity of substi-
tution in these two type of models.
4.1 Malthusian Models
One of the most important ways in which σ aﬀects models of Malthusian
economies is via its eﬀect on transition speeds  how fast the model transitions
back to steady state after being shocked. This simple observation that σ
aﬀects transition speeds has major implications for a large set of models which
attempt to explain the takeoﬀ from Malthusian stagnation to growth.
To demonstrate how σ aﬀects transition speeds, I develop a simple Malthu-
sian model based on Lee (1973). Consider the following CES production func-
tion with Hicks-neutral technological progress:
Y = At (αL
ρ + (1− α)Xρ) 1ρ
where L is labor and can change over time, and X is a ﬁxed factor. This
implies a wage of:
∂Y
dL
= w = αAtL
ρ−1 (αLρ + (1− α)Xρ) 1−ρρ (10)
Labor evolves according to the following law of motion:
Lt+1 − Lt
Lt
= gL = ft −mt, (11)
where f is the fertility rate and m is the mortality rate. Fertility is an function
of the wage:
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ft = δw
γ
t , (12)
where γ > 0 so that ∂f
dw
> 0. Combining equations (11) and (12) yields the
following diﬀerence equation for labor:
Lt+1 = Lt (1 + δw
γ
t −m) (13)
Note that population will be in a steady state when δwγt −m = 0, implying
w∗ =
(
m
δ
) 1
γ
.
Notice that the wage is independent of the level of technological progress or
the amount of land. As in most Malthusian models, any increase in either of
these variables will lead to more population, but not increases in the steady
state level of population. This can be seen by plugging the steady state wage
back into the wage equation to pin down the steady state level of population
L∗
L∗t = Xt


(
m
δ
) 1
γ
αAt (1− α)
1−ρ
ρ

ρ
1−ρ
− α
1− α

− 1
ρ
,
where
∂L∗t
dAt
> 0 and
∂L∗t
dXt
> 0.17
Using equations (10), (12), and (13) to simulate the system, I can shock
technology in the system to see its eﬀect on population and the wage. To
calibrate the model, I use m = δ = 1, α = 0.8 corresponding to a land share of
20%, and set the pre-shock level of technology to be At = 1. I also set γ = 0.5
and Xt = 1. I run the model until it reaches its steady state. Then I increase
the level of technology by 10% to At = 1.1. I use a Cobb-Douglas production
function initially.
Figure 8 shows how the dynamical system evolves in response to a shock
17Notice that we need
(
(mδ )
1
γ
αAt
) ρ
1−ρ
> α for this expression to make sense. In the analysis
that follows, I choose parameter values such that this is the case.
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in technology. The 10% increase in productivity initially raises wages by 10%,
leading to higher fertility in the next period. Population grows since now
fertility is higher than mortality, and the wage begins to fall. Falling wages
leads to falling fertility, and eventually wages fall back to their steady state,
while population stabilizes at a new equilibrium level.
From the wage equation (10) we can calculate the elasticity of wages with
respect to labor:
∂w
dL
· L
w
= −φx
σ
,
where φx is the fraction of income paid to land. This elasticity is key in
understanding the eﬀect of the σ on transitions speeds. As labor is added,
the wage will fall faster if the elasticity of substitution is low. In addition, the
wage will also fall faster the more important land is in production as measured
by its share of national income.18This eﬀect is shown graphically in Figure 9.
The three lines represent the dynamics of the model under diﬀerent elasticities
of substitution: 0.5, 1, and 2. The smaller the elasticity of substitution, the
faster wages fall.
Since the population growth rate is positively associated with wages, a
small σ implies that the population growth rate will fall faster as well. There-
fore, the overall population growth caused by a change in technology will be
smaller for economies will small elasticities of substitution. This can be seen
in Figure 10. When wages fall faster due to smaller σ, this implies popu-
lation growth will also fall faster. In the case of Cobb-Douglas, a 10% in-
crease in productivity will cause the new steady state level of population to be(
At+1
At
) 1
α = 1.15 ≈ 1.61 times higher than the pre-shock steady state, compared
18Vollrath (2010) makes this observation by using a Cobb-Douglas production function
with land and labor as inputs to show the eﬀect of α, labor's share of income, on pre-
industrial levels of income. He ﬁnds that larger α leads to higher income levels before
the industrial revolution via a larger fraction of the workforce employed in the agricultural
sector. This is also true for σ; the smaller is σ, the larger is the fraction of labor employed
in the agricultural sector (analysis available upon request). Although both papers look at
the eﬀect of diﬀerent parameters, the results both run through the speed by which wages
fall as labor is added. Therefore, all the results I will describe in this section for small σ
will be similar for larger α; and all Vollrath's theoretical results for larger α will be similar
for smaller σ.
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with 1.78 times higher when σ = 2 and 1.46 times higher when σ = 0.5.
Finally, suppose that population suddenly fell in the model. Since labor
has declined, the marginal product of labor will rise. However, the degree
to which is rises will depend on the elasticity of substitution. In ﬁgure 11, I
exogenously reduce steady-state population by 0.1% in the model, and trace
out the eﬀect on wages over time. When σ is small, the wage rises higher than
when σ is large. Afterwards the wage falls faster in the economy with a small
σ, as noted previously.
How will this aﬀect current models of the takeoﬀ to growth fromMalthusian
stagnation? Consider the observations made thus far:
1. Small σ will cause wages to fall faster when labor increases.
2. Small σ will cause wages to rise faster if labor falls.
3. Small σ will cause increases in productivity to translate into smaller
steady state population levels.
I group the literature on the takeoﬀ to growth from Malthusian stagnation
into 3 categories, and discuss how these observations aﬀect each group.
Models that Depend on Population Size
One set of models explaining the transition to growth from Malthusian stagna-
tion feature a positive relationship between the rate of technological progress
and population size. This positive relationship has been used in a number of
growth models, beginning with the endogenous growth models of Romer (1990)
and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Initially these models focused on explaining
cross-country contemporaneous diﬀerences in technological progress and eco-
nomic growth rates. R&D aspects of technological progress were emphasized
in these models, and looked at the eﬀect of market size on proﬁtability of
innovation, or scale eﬀects in the production of ideas.
Later these endogenous growth models were used to analyze the history of
economic development. Kremer (1993) noted that world and regional popula-
tion density was a surprisingly good predictor of the historical rate of techno-
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logical progress. Diamond (1997) argued that societies in areas of the world
with geographic features compatible with supporting dense populations and
trading ideas far surpassed other societies in technological progress by 1500.
Jones (2001) and Valor and Weil (1999, 2000) applied this concept to the
transition to modern growth from the Malthusian steady state.
One feature of these models is that once technological progress is fast
enough, the economy begins to transition away from the Malthusian steady
state. Since the rate of technological progress is determined by the size of the
population19, the transition begins once population reaches a threshold level.
The main implication of the elasticity of substitution in these models has to
do with observation 3 above: improvements in technology will lead to smaller
increases in population if the elasticity of substitution is low. Therefore, a
small elasticity of substitution slows the transition from Malthusian stagna-
tion to sustained growth. This eﬀect works through two channels. First, the
level of technology itself will have to reach a larger threshold to attain the
same threshold level of population than economies with a higher elasticity of
substitution. Secondly, the growth rate of technological progress will be slower
in the economy with a smaller elasticity of substitution, because the level of
population will be lower.
Models that Depend on Wage Levels
Another set of models which depend on the elasticity of substitution are those
in which the transition occurs after attaining some threshold level of income.
An example of a model in this category are Voth and Voigtländer (2006),
where the probability of transitioning to growth depends positively on the
level of income. Other models depend on rising incomes to spur demand for
the manufacturing sector or other luxury goods, thereby igniting the industrial
revolution.
Aside from models in which income levels determine when countries will in-
dustrialize, divergence in pre-industrial incomes is interesting in its own right.
19At least initially  human capital formation plays are role later in many of these uniﬁed
growth models.
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A standard Malthusian prediction is that income levels will return to subsis-
tence in the long run. Therefore, there should be no persistence in diﬀerences
in cross-country incomes in the Malthusian world, unless there are diﬀerences
in the subsistence level of income. However, several scholars have argued that
incomes in Europe were higher than the rest of the world, even during the
Malthusian regime. For example, Voth and Voigtländer (2010b) argue that
Western Europe was able to maintain higher levels of income than the rest of
the world due to unique fertility patterns from delayed marriage. Diamond
(1997) argued that pre-industrial divergence in incomes and technology lead
to the great divergence in incomes observed today. Voth and Voigtländer
(2010a) explain persistent income diﬀerences using a model in which positive
wage shocks are reinforced by increases the amount of plagues, wars, and the
rate of urbanization, eventually leading to perpetually higher death rates and
permanently higher incomes.
The main eﬀect of the elasticity of substitution in this set of models is
related to observation 2 above: a small elasticity of substitution will imply
that wages rise more for a given decrease in population. All of the Voth and
Voigtländer papers point to rising wages after the Black Death as the impetus
which lead to plagues, wars, urbanization, and changes in fertility. These in
turn kept population low and wages high, eventually leading to a pre-industrial
divergence in incomes and the industrial revolution in Europe. If the elasticity
of substitution in pre-industrial England was small, then the positive eﬀect of
the Black Death on wages would be higher. Therefore, the reinforcing eﬀects
of plagues, wars, urbanization, and European marriage patterns would be even
stronger, and the eventual divergence in European incomes that much higher.
Presumably, this would cause the industrial revolution to happen even faster.
Models that Depend on Sectoral Shift from Biased Technological
Progress
Hansen and Prescott (2002) presented a uniﬁed growth model in which biased
technological progress causes the demographic transition. There are two sec-
tors, the Malthus (agricultural) sector which uses land, labor, and capital as
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inputs; and the Solow (manufacturing) sector which only uses labor and capi-
tal. Each sector produces the same good, and technological progress increases
signiﬁcantly faster in the Solow sector than the Malthus sector. Initially, the
Malthus sector is the only sector operative, and is in a Malthusian steady
state.
In this setup, the transition is inevitable and will happen rapidly since
technological progress in the Solow sector grows over 16 times faster than in
the Malthus sector. The transition occurs when technology in the Solow sector
grows to the point that it is proﬁtable to produce output. Both sectors are
operative, and capital and labor begin to ﬂow from the Malthus sector to the
Solow sector. Eventually, virtually all the capital and labor are employed in the
Solow sector. Whereas the dynamics of the economy followed the Malthusian
economy when only the Malthusian sector was operative, the economy behaves
according to the Solow model when the Solow sector employs almost all the
capital and labor.
A lower σ in the Malthus sector implies that as labor and capital leave,
their marginal products rise faster, inducing more labor and capital to remain.
As a result, labor and capital leave the Malthus sector slower, delaying the
takeoﬀ to growth. For example, in the ﬁrst period after the beginning of the
transition, there is three times more labor in the Malthus sector when σ = 0.5
than when σ = 2, and twice as much than when σ = 1.20 This result is similar
to the ﬁnding of the eﬀect of σ on the Galor-Weil model  low elasticities of
substitution delay the demographic transition and takeoﬀ to modern growth.
4.2 Population and Development
Aside from having implications for land share and models of the demographic
transition, the elasticity of substitution between land and other factors is in-
tegral to understanding the extent to which population size aﬀects output.
Surprisingly little concrete empirical research has been devoted to this most
simple, yet important question. Most studies of the eﬀect of population on
20Due to space constraints, the full analysis and simulation will not be outlined in the
paper, but is available upon request.
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output deal with eﬀect of the population growth rate, rather than population
level. For example, the eﬀects of dependency ratios/demographic structure,
accumulable factor dilution, changes in fertility and mortality and their eﬀect
on labor force participation, savings, etc. and so forth all work through the
growth rate of population rather than its absolute size.
This is even more surprising when one considers that the father of popula-
tion economics, Malthus, originally framed the question in terms of levels, not
rates. He conjectured that in the face of a ﬁxed amount of arable land, food
production would not be able to increase fast enough to sustain an exponen-
tially growing population with a shrinking land-labor ratio. This argument
contains an implicit assumption about the substitutability of land in food pro-
duction  that it is small. It is diﬃcult to understand how population size
aﬀects production without understanding the substitutability of ﬁxed factors.
Over the last 200 years, the dire predictions of Malthus have not come to
fruition. However, this does not imply than large populations do not depress
wages. The extent to which this happens is a direct consequence of the elas-
ticity of substitution between land and all other factors. Recently, Weil and
Wilde (2009) calculate the eﬀect of a doubling in population size on income
per capita. Assuming that each factor of production is paid its marginal prod-
uct, one can solve for the fraction of national income paid to each factor, and
then take the ratio of incomes in two points in time based on diﬀering levels
of inputs. Using a CES production function similar to (5), they derive
yt
y0
=
(1− φ0) + φ0 (L0
Lt
)σ−1
σ
 σσ−1 ,
where y is income per capita, φ is the fraction of national income paid to land,
and the subscripts index time.
In this simple example, all that is needed to estimate the eﬀect of popula-
tion size on income per capita is data on φ and σ.21 Table 4 takes several values
of each parameter and shows the corresponding change in income per capita.
21L0/Lt = 0.5 since we consider a doubling in population.
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The larger the elasticity of substitution between land and other factors, the
less impact an increase in population has on standards of living.
Another recent paper which depends crucially on the elasticity of land
and other factors is Ashram et al (2008). They estimate of the eﬀect of a
unspeciﬁed health intervention which improves life expectancy from 40 to 60.
In addition to improving the productivity of workers via health and education
human capital, this reduction in mortality increases population size.
Figure 13 shows the eﬀect of this intervention on income over a 165 year
time horizon. With an elasticity of substitution greater than unity, the health
intervention improves income in the long run. In this case, the negative eﬀects
of population size on income are small relative to the productivity beneﬁts from
the health intervention. However, if the elasticity of substitution is less than
one, the overall eﬀect becomes negative. Since it is diﬃcult to substitute away
from land, shrinking land per person has a large negative eﬀect on production.
This negative eﬀect of population on income overwhelms the positive eﬀect of
worker productivity. In the case of an elasticity of substitution of 0.5, income
per worker decreases by about 25% after 50 years and never recovers. Thus
the same health intervention could have opposite results depending on the
elasticity of substitution.
Finally, Ashram et al (2010) use a similar model to quantify the eﬀect of
a reduction in fertility on income per capita. They model several diﬀerent
channels by which fertility reduction aﬀects income, including what they call
the Malthus channel, or the eﬀect on income per capita due to ﬁxed factor
congestion.
In the long run, the elasticity of substitution plays a large role in deter-
mining the magnitude of the eﬀect on income per capita. Figure 12 shows the
eﬀect of this intervention on income over a 165 year time horizon. If σ = 2, the
Malthus eﬀect is small since land is easily substitutable. Income 150 years af-
ter the fertility intervention is about 45% higher. However, if σ = 0.5, income
rises to about 130% higher than baseline over the same time horizon  about
three times higher than the previous case. The Malthus channel becomes the
most important channel by which fertility decline aﬀects income.
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These studies show that understanding the value of σ is essential for ac-
curately assessing the impact of policies which aﬀect population. The extent
to which ﬁxed factors can be substituted for non-ﬁxed factors in production,
especially in agriculture, is central to understanding population's aﬀect on liv-
ing standards. Considering the large investment of resources devoted to health
interventions and promoting fertility control across the developing world, the
fact that almost no research until now has been devoted to the estimation of
σ is quite surprising.
5 Conclusion
The elasticity of substitution between ﬁxed and non-ﬁxed factors is an ex-
tremely important parameter in a large number of economic models. It gov-
erns dynamics around the steady state in Malthusian models of the economy.
It also is essential for understanding the movement away from the Malthusian
steady state and takeoﬀ to modern growth which has occurred in most areas
of the world during the last 200 years. It predicts speed of the demographic
transition and the order in which countries will industrialize.
In addition, its has important applications to the question of how popula-
tion size aﬀects economic development. The extent to which ﬁxed factors can
be substituted in production has implications for how strong the negative eﬀect
of population on growth is. The eﬃcacy of interventions which aﬀect popu-
lation size, such as family planning programs or health interventions which
aﬀect mortality, will be aﬀected by this substitutability.
Despite the importance of this parameter, no credible estimates of this elas-
ticity are available. In this paper, I estimated this elasticity in pre-industrial
England. I found that the elasticity of substitution was about 0.6  signiﬁ-
cantly lower than most models assume. In addition, I estimate the direction
of biased technological progress and the degree of induced innovation. I ﬁnd
that technology was scarce factor saving. After the Black Death when land
was plentiful and labor scarce, productivity growth saved on labor. After-
wards when population grew again and land became scarce, productivity was
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land saving. An additional 1 million people (an increase of about 1/3 over
population's median level over the period 1200-1750) increased the diﬀerential
growth rate between land- and labor-augmenting productivity growth by 0.1%
per year.
There are several directions future research could take. One interesting
implication of my work is that the elasticity of substitution should predict the
order in which countries begin the demographic transition. Estimating this
elasticity in a set of countries would allow us to determine if this correlation
exists. Since diﬀerent models predict diﬀerent eﬀects of the elasticity of sub-
stitution on transition speeds, this analysis could be a method of testing the
veracity of these models.
In addition, obtaining a well-identiﬁed estimate of the elasticity of substi-
tution for a modern developing country would be extremely important. As
mentioned previously, it is extremely diﬃcult to estimate this elasticity well
due to a number of econometric problems. But since this parameter aﬀects
the eﬃcacy of any number of health interventions currently being pursued in
the developing world, having a good idea of the value of this elasticity should
be of utmost importance to policy makers.
Finally, the implications of induced innovation for the dynamics around the
Malthusian steady state could be explored, as well as its eﬀect of the transition
from this steady state to modern growth.
Appendix: Plague Epidemics
List of national epidemics of the plague. List compiled by Brian Williams,
1996.
1348-1349 The Black Death.
1361 Pestis secunda or Pestis puerorum [Gottfried (1983) pg. 130];
[Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 23].
1369 Pestis tertia [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 23].
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1375 Pestis quarta [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 23, 135-136].
1379-1383 Pestis quinta; 'In 1379 there was a great plague in the Northern
parts...under the year 1382, a very pestilential fever in many parts
of the country' [Creighton (1965) pg. 218]; London was aicted in
1382, with Kent and others parts in 1383 [219].
1390-1391 A prolonged outbreak through 1390-1391 'described not without
some detail' [1:219]; [Gottfried (1983) pg. 131]; '"a grete pestilence
in England"' [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 137].
1399-1400 [Gottfried (1983) pg. 131].
1405-1406 [Gottfried (1983) pg. 131]; [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 141].
1411-1412 'another national epidemic' [Gottfried (1983) pg. 131].
1420-1423 Norfolk, 'but the Rolls of Parliament bear undoubted witness to a
very severe prevalence of plague in the North about the same time'
[Creighton (1965) pg. 221]; 1420 and 1423 [Gottfried (1978) pg.
36]; 1423 [Gottfried (1983) pg. 131].
1426-1429 [Gottfried (1978) pg. 36]; 'a London visitation in 1426, and a
national epidemic in 1428-29' [Gottfried (1983) pg. 132].
1433-1435 'Here then, early in 1434, is the ﬁrst distinct suggestion in the pe-
riod 1430-1480 of something more that a local or regional epidemic'
[Gottfried (1978) pg. 37]; 'a national epidemic that lasted from
1433 to 1435' [Gottfried (1983) pg. 132]; 1433 or 1434 [Shrews-
bury (1970) pg. 143].
1438-1439 'a national epidemic' [Gottfried (1983) pg. 132]; [Shrewsbury (1970)
pg. 144].
1447-1454 'Parts of England experienced plague epidemics in 11 out of the 18
years between 1442 and 1459' [Gottfried (1983) pg. 132]; 1447-1454
[Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 145].
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1463-1465 [Creighton (1965) pg. 229]; 'From 1463 to 1465, another severe
epidemic hit the entire kingdom' [Gottfried (1983) pg. 132]; 1463
'"a greate pestilence...all England over'" [Shrewsbury (1970) pg.
146].
1467 'In 1467 another epidemic swept through parts of England, and
was possibly national in scope. If the Rolls of Parliament are to be
believed, it was unquestionably an epidemic of plague' [Gottfried
(1978) pg. 42]; [Gottfried (1983) pg. 132].
1471 'evidence indicates that this epidemic was one of plague' [Gottfried
(1978) pg. 44]; 'in 1471, all of England was overwhelmed' [Got-
tfried (1983) pg. 132].
1479-1480 'This year [1479] saw great mortality and death in London and
many other parts of this realm' [Creighton (1965) pg. 231-232],
'the great epidemic of 1479 in London and elsewhere' [286]; 'The
most virulent epidemic of the ﬁfteenth century was the plague of
1479-1480' [Gottfried (1978) pg. 14]; 'From autumn to autumn, a
combined epidemic of bubonic and pneumonic plague devastated
all of Britain' [Gottfried (1983) pg. 133].
1499-1500 'the great epidemic of 1499-1500, in London and apparently also
in the country' [Creighton (1965) pg. 287]; [Gottfried (1978) pg.
14]; [Gottfried (1983) pg. 156]; the sixteenth century opened with
'a great pestilence throughout all England' [Shrewsbury (1970) pg.
159].
1509-1510 [Gottfried (1978) pg. 156]; 1509, a 'great plague' that aicted
various parts of England [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 160].
1516-1517 [Gottfried (1983) pg. 156].
1523 [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 163].
1527-1530 [Gottfried (1983) pg. 156].
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1532 'There is supporting evidence that the disease was widespread'
[Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 168].
1544-1546 1544 'several scattered, localized outbreaks of plague in England'
[Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 178], 1545 north-east [pg. 180], south coast
[pg. 181], 1546 westwards [pg. 182].
1563 'probably the worst of the great metropolitan epidemics' [Shrews-
bury (1970) pg. 176], 'and then extended as a major national
outbreak of it' [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 189].
1585-1587 'bubonic plague was busy in numerous places in England in the
years from 1585 to 1587 inclusively' [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 237].
1593 the 'great metropolitan and national epidemic of 1593' [Shrewsbury
(1970) pgs. 176, 222].
1603-1604 [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 264].
1609-1610 'The next two years, 1609 and 1610, witnessed several severe out-
breaks of bubonic plague in English towns' [Shrewsbury (1970) pg.
299].
1625 'the great outburst of 1625' [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 313].
1637 'widely distributed in 1637 and a number of places experienced
more or less severe visitations of it' [Shrewsbury (1970) pg. 389].
1645 'The year 1645 was one of severe plague in several towns at the
same time' [Creighton (1965) pg. 557].
1665 The Great Plague, aﬀecting London in the main.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Method OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Instrument Plagues 100 Plague Current ΔPlagues 100
Dep. Var. ln(r/w) ln(r/w) ln(r/w) Δln(r/w) Δln(r/w)
ln(Pop) 1.501*** 1.685*** 1.572*** Δln(Pop) 0.753 1.92
(0.103) (0.115) (0.139) (0.359) (1.220)
Year 0.00244 0.00508*** 0.00567*** Const 0.0248 0.0329
(0.00147) (0.00183) (0.00179) (0.0448) (0.1230)
ΣPop -0.00763* -0.0152*** -0.0166*** Pop -0.00751 -0.0131
(0.00403) (0.00523) (0.00514) (0.00987) (0.02970)
Obs 55 55 55 54 54
Implied σ 0.666*** 0.594*** 0.636*** 1.327 0.521
(0.046) (0.040) (0.056) (0.632) (0.331)
Implied γ -0.163%* -0.302%*** -0.361%*** -0.329% -0.171%
(0.096) (0.097) (0.104) (0.615) (0.639)
Implied θ 0.051%* 0.090%*** 0.106%*** 0.100% 0.068%
(0.003) (0.003) (0.029) (0.132) (0.152)
1st Stage 82.94 16.7 1.04
F-tests 66.47 36.7 75.35
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Standard errors in parentheses.  OLS regressions use Newey-West 
errors with one lag.  The significance levels on ln(Pop), Δln(Pop), and Implied σ test whether the 
coefficient is different from one.  All other significance levels test whether they are different from zero.
Since two instruments are used in the 2SLS regressions, the two 1st stage F-test values report the joint
significance of the two instruments in each of the two 1st stage regressions.
Levels Differences
Table 2: Results with Biased Technology Change
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